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FOREIGN NATIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Austen Parrish* 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of the more pressing issues related to global governance and world 
order lie at the intersection of foreign relations law, international law, and 
constitutional law.  What role does the Constitution play in ensuring the 
United States lives up to the nation’s international law obligations in an 
evolving period of globalization?  More provocatively, to what degree will 
the United States uphold its international legal obligations if not mandated 
by the Constitution?  And what role do domestic courts play in enforcing 
these international law obligations?  In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has not directly addressed the question of the rights, if any, that foreign states 
have under the U.S. Constitution. 
Into this mix comes Professor Ingrid Wuerth’s article, The Due Process 
and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations.1  With a textual and 
historical bent to her analysis, Professor Wuerth’s core claim is that foreign 
states and state-owned enterprises are entitled to some litigation-related 
constitutional protections emanating from separation of powers and the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, independent and separate from any 
legislative protections, such as those provided under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.  In so doing, she invokes Founding-era history to launch a 
broadside re-examination of prevailing understandings.  In this way, her 
article serves as the opposing bookend to a well-regarded article by Professor 
Lori Damrosch from the 1980s (and earlier statements from Professor Louis 
Henkin in the 1970s) that took a different view.2  She also contributes to a 
growing body of literature that more fully examines the role that domestic 
 
*  Dean and James H. Rudy Professor, Indiana University Bloomington, Maurer School of 
Law.  I am grateful to Ji Min Kim and Corbin Neumann for their research assistance. 
 
 1. 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019). 
 2. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483 (1987); 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 254 (1972) (noting that foreign 
governments “have no constitutional rights . . . ”); cf. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 636 n. 13 (“The 
leading scholarly treatment of foreign states and the Constitution concludes that text and 
history have little to offer and that foreign states lack constitutional rights as against the federal 
government . . . .  This Article disagrees.”). 
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institutions play in global governance.3  On the one hand, Professor Wuerth’s 
article underscores how much the structural features of international law are 
baked into our Constitution.  What distinguishes her position from the prior 
work of others is how she embraces older case law and Founding-era 
understandings in an attempt to influence current doctrine on the ground. 
This short Essay commenting on Professor Wuerth’s article does three 
things.  First, it describes the topic’s significance, and explains why future 
discussion on the procedural rights of foreign states and state-owned 
enterprises is worthwhile.  The issues are increasingly important given the 
rise of state-owned enterprises as major players in the global economy and 
as the amount of transnational regulation—untethered to international 
agreement—continues to grow, while the doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity appears to narrow.  Second, it situates Professor Wuerth’s article 
within a broader conversation.  While a dearth of literature addresses the 
rights of foreign states, the literature that does exist intersects with other 
important strands of scholarship related to global governance and 
transnational regulation, as well as a renewed interest in how the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to foreign entities.  Lastly, the 
Essay makes some brief observations on the substance of Professor Wuerth’s 
claims. 
I am more skeptical than Professor Wuerth about locating the sovereign 
rights of foreign states in constitutional doctrine, and I am more sanguine that 
courts will take her up on her invitation to embrace more original 
understandings derived from international law.  In other contexts, 
constitutional limitations generally do not apply to foreigners.  While her 
article resolves one inconsistency—the treatment of foreign states as 
compared to foreign corporations when it comes to procedural rights—it 
reveals other inconsistencies.  And in many ways, the protections that 
Professor Wuerth seeks to have recognized already exist under established 
international law.  That said, Professor Wuerth is undoubtedly right that the 
basic structural limitations of our international system related to sovereign 
authority were well-understood at the Founding.4  To the extent that U.S. 
courts overlook or fail to engage with international law’s limitations on state 
power, locating the basic structural limitations of the international system in 
our constitutional system may be prudent. 
I.  A GROWING IMPORTANCE 
Professor Wuerth’s article comes at an important time, both as the amount 
of litigation involving foreign states has grown and as the number and size 
 
 3. See generally Christopher A. Whytock, From International Law and International 
Relations to Law and World Politics, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICS: THE 
POLITICS OF LAW AND THE JUDICIARY (William Thompson & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2018). 
 4. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 636–39, 648 (noting that “the relationship among states 
of the Union was governed by international law before the Constitution was enacted, and some 
of those international law protections were preserved and entrenched by the Constitution 
itself”). 
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of state-owned enterprises continues to expand too.  Changes in how courts 
apply foreign sovereign immunity, and legislative willingness to extend 
judicial power broadly, mean that the constitutional limits on judicial power 
are likely to assume greater importance.  Below, I highlight a few points that 
Professor Wuerth addresses only briefly. 
A.  The Rise of State-Owned Enterprises 
Appreciating the rise of state-owned enterprises is key to understanding 
the stakes involved.  State-owned enterprises are an increasingly important 
part of the global economy and play an important role in cross-border 
interactions.5  Many of the world’s largest companies are state-owned.6  Not 
only is there a growing number of state-owned enterprises, but in certain 
sectors state-owned enterprises are the largest companies in the sector.7  They 
are also the fastest growing.8 
The size and impact are staggering.  In 2013, one analysis described just 
how significant the holdings of state-owned enterprises have become: 
The combined sales of these [state-owned enterprises] amounted to USD 
3.6 trillion, representing more than 10% of the aggregate sales of the 2,000 
[world’s] largest companies, and exceeding the 2010 [gross national 
income] of countries like the United Kingdom, France or Germany.  The 
value of sales of these [state-owned enterprises] was tantamount to almost 
6% of world [gross domestic product] . . . .  Their market value 
corresponded to 11% of the market capitalisation of all listed companies 
worldwide . . . .9 
 
 5. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational 
Companies, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 919, 919 (2014) (“The globalization of state-owned 
multinational companies (SOMNCs) and the wide variety of approaches taken by the state as 
a cross-border investor have become an important phenomenon.”); see also Bernardo 
Bortolotti et al., Innovation of State-Owned Enterprises 2 (BAFFI CAREFIN Centre, Working 
Paper No. 72, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3150280 [https://perma.cc/6B73-QXU7] (“The 
past two decades have seen not just an increase in state ownership of firms, following a 
previous wave of privatizations in western markets, but also substantial changes in the 
dominant type of state ownership model.”). 
 6. Przemyslaw Kowalski et al., State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy 
Implications 20 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Working Paper No. 147, 2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en [https://perma.cc/R9D8-NVZB] (stating that 
“204 out of the world’s 2,000 largest publicly listed firms were identified as SOEs.  They 
originated from 37 different countries with China leading the list (70 SOEs), followed by India 
(30), Russia and the United Arab Emirates (9 each) and Malaysia (8).”). 
 7. Id. at 27–29. 
 8. Xiaobing Huang, Reform of State-Owned Enterprises and Productivity Growth in 
China, 33 ASIAN-PACIFIC ECON. LITERATURE 67–77 (2019) (although the aggregate 
productivity of SOEs is lower than that of other types of enterprises, their growth rate is the 
fastest). 
 9. Kowalski et al., supra note 6, at 20; see also Garry D. Bruton et al., State-Owned 
Enterprises Around the World as Hybrid Organizations, 29 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSP. 92, 92 
(2015) (noting that state-owned enterprises “generate approximately one tenth of world gross 
domestic product (GDP) and represent approximately 20% of global equity market 
value . . . .”). 
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By 2017, the assets of Chinese state-owned enterprises had grown to over 
USD 10.4 trillion.10  That same year, profit of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises was estimated to exceed USD 453 billion.11 
The increasing market power and influence of state-owned enterprises—
after a period of decline—is now well documented.12  From 2005 to 2012, 
“nine of the 15 largest initial public offerings” involved state-owned 
enterprises.13  And some level of state-ownership appears to assist in the 
international expansion of firms.14  For the BRICS, the significance of state-
owned enterprises is even greater,15 particularly in China.16  Given China’s 
increasing power in the global economy, we can expect state-owned 
enterprises to continue to play an important role in global markets.17 
B.  Unilateral Global Regulation 
The growing global prominence of state-owned enterprises is, however, 
only part of the story.  Foreign governments play a prominent role in 
transnational litigation in other ways.  Foreign governments have filed cases 
in U.S. courts as plaintiffs.18  And foreign governments increasingly 
 
 10. State-Owned Enterprises Are a Hard Habit China Doesn’t Want to Break, STRATFOR 
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/state-owned-enterprises-are-hard-habit-
china-doesnt-want-break [https://perma.cc/JDU6-2S8D]. 
 11. Chi Dehua, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises See Dramatic Profit Growth in 2017, 
GB TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://gbtimes.com/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-see-
dramatic-profit-growth-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/F9XK-7H99]. 
 12. See, e.g., State Capitalism, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/01/21/the-rise-of-state-capitalism 
[https://perma.cc/J5RU-3ZC5]; see also How Strong Is China’s Economy, ECONOMIST (May 
26, 2012), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/05/26/how-strong-is-chinas-economy 
[https://perma.cc/9E8H-8T49]; Aldo Musacchio & Francisco Flores-Macias, The Return of 
State-Owned Enterprises: Should We Be Afraid?, HARV. INT’L REV. WEBSITE (Apr. 4, 2009), 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=36235 [https://perma.cc/AC26-7HX5]. 
 13. Bruton et al., supra note 9, at 92. 
 14. Sergio Mariotti & Riccardo Marzano, Varieties of Capitalism and the 
Internationalization of State-Owned Enterprises, 50 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 669, 669 (2019) 
(asserting that “state-dominated enterprises internationalize more . . . than privately-owned 
enterprises in coordinated (liberal) market economies, whereas they exhibit an inconstant 
behavior in state-influenced market economies.”); cf. Kiattichai Kalasin et al., State 
Ownership and International Expansion: The S-Curve Relationship, GLOBAL STRATEGY J., 
Mar. 2019, at 1 (finding that “[f]irms with a medium level of state ownership have an 
increasing level of international expansion because they have greater access to resources while 
the negative effects of state control are restrained by the dominance of private owners.”). 
 15. See Kowalski, et al., supra note 6, at 21-23; see also JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANA M. 
LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 62 (2d ed. 2008). 
 16. Amir Guluzade, Explained, the Role of China’s State-Owned Companies, WORLD 
ECON. F. (May 7, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-
companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/ [https://perma.cc/HF36-52FR] (noting that China 
has “109 corporations listed on the Fortune Global 500—but only 15% of them are privately 
owned”). 
 17. See generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY, THE STATE STRIKES BACK: THE END OF ECONOMIC 
REFORM IN CHINA? (2019) (describing and critiquing the risks of China’s state-led growth 
approach). 
 18. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the Case 
Against “Judicial Imperialism,” 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 656 (2016). 
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participate in U.S. litigation through amicus brief submissions.19  It is not 
uncommon now for U.S. courts to address issues involving foreign nations.20  
And, as Professor Wuerth describes, changes in the doctrine related to foreign 
sovereign immunity increasingly mean that foreign nations are viable 
defendants for U.S. actions.21  That is particularly true after the dramatic 
expansion of laws post-September 11, which permitted U.S. citizens to file 
claims against foreign governments that had allegedly materially supported 
terrorist acts.22  Somewhat along a similar vein, investor-state dispute 
settlement cases have increased in recent decades, as foreign states are 
challenged by foreign investors before international arbitration tribunals.23 
These phenomena are not surprising given the United States’ withdrawal 
from some certain forms of international collaboration and the dramatic 
growth of unilateral regulatory action, where the United States (and now 
other countries) use domestic law to address global challenges that once were 
the domain of international law and international relations.24  To the extent 
that domestic law is projected abroad to govern global activities, the 
likelihood of conflict increases.  A number of commentators have described 
how cross-border, transnational litigation is common,25 and the practice, for 
good or for bad, of global forum shopping has become more prevalent.26 
Another phenomenon suggests that the questions raised by Professor 
Wuerth will continue to be salient.  While the Supreme Court has indicated 
 
 19. See generally Kristen Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 
VA. L. REV. 289 (2016); Matteo Godi, A Historical Perspective on Filings by Foreign 
Sovereigns at the U.S. Supreme Court:  Amici or Inimici Curiae?, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 409 
(2017); Daniel Fahrenthold, Note, Navigating “Respectful Consideration”:  Foreign 
Sovereign Amici in U.S. Courts, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3360806 [https://perma.cc/RWX6-
4CN3]. 
 20. Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 10–23 (2016) 
(describing ways in which U.S. courts “sit in judgment on foreign states”). 
 21. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 640–41, 676–79; see also Jacqueline M. Fitch, Note, If the 
Shoe Fits:  Rethinking Minimum Contacts and the FSIA Commercial Activity Exception, 76 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 123, 124-27, 149–51 (2019) (describing a more restrictive 
interpretation of foreign sovereign immunity).  See generally Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).  But see OBB Personenverkher AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 
390, 393 (2015). 
 22. See Juan Basombrio, Nations on Trial, L.A. LAWYER, Apr. 2017, at 16–21 (describing 
how new measures designed to address international terrorism have led to increased litigation 
against foreign nations). 
 23. See generally Yong Kyun Kim, States Sued:  Democracy, the Rule of Law, and 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), 43 INT’L INTERACTIONS 300 (2017). 
 24. See generally Developments in the Law:  Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226 
(2011) (describing an increase in extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 25. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1083–84 (2015) 
(“Transnational suits—cases involving foreign parties, foreign conduct, foreign law, or 
foreign effects—and the law that governs them have growing significance in the United States 
and around the world.”).  See generally Austen L. Parrish, Personal Jurisdiction:  The 
Transnational Difference, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 103–09 (2019) (describing the growth of 
transnational litigation and the reasons for it). 
 26. See generally Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2016); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping 
System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011). 
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its unwillingness to hastily assume that Congress has intended to regulate 
foreigners for their conduct in foreign countries, Congress continues to pass 
a significant number of laws that seek to reach foreign conduct untethered 
from international agreement.  Once mostly limited to the area of antitrust 
and securities regulation, where gaps in global regulation existed, now a 
wide-range of domestic laws purport to address foreign conduct.27  Also, as 
law firms with large global practices compete with one another for 
transnational cases, one can expect litigation to be an increasingly significant 
way for foreign nations to engage with one another.28  Separate from this, 
continued state-supported terrorism, wide-spread reports of foreign 
interference with elections, and foreign state-directed cyber-attacks29 mean 
that courts are called upon to resolve claims against foreign nations.  Given 
this, as Professor Wuerth correctly notes, one can expect cases involving 
foreign nations to continue to have a prominent place in U.S. litigation.30 
C.  A Broader Context 
Over the last few years, three strands of scholarship have been prominent 
at the intersection of international law and foreign relations, to which 
Professor Wuerth’s piece is related. 
The first is a renewed interested in the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause and the limitations it imposes on exercising judicial jurisdiction over 
foreigners.  Driven by recent decisions that curtail the jurisdiction of state 
courts under the Fourteenth Amendment, a number of commentators have 
sought to deploy a national-contacts approach under the Fifth Amendment to 
 
 27. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94–166, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2007) (describing how a significant number of 
federal criminal statutes have extraterritorial application ); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. 
on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session, UN Doc. A/61/10, at 516 (2006) (describing the 
“increasingly common phenomenon” of U.S. laws regulating foreign conduct); INT’L BAR 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 5–6 (2009) (“[T]he 
growth of multinational corporations doing business across borders and on a global scale, the 
ease of modern travel between states, the globalisation of banking and stock exchanges, 
technological developments such as the internet, and the emergence of transnational criminal 
enterprises and activities, have combined to encourage states to exercise jurisdiction beyond 
their territorial boundaries.”) 
 28. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization:  The Case 
of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2013). 
 29. For examples, see Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown:  Law Enforcement 
Jurisdiction on the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2016) (describing what “may 
well be the greatest extraterritorial expansion of enforcement jurisdiction in U.S. law 
enforcement history” related to criminal activity on the dark web).  See generally Paige C. 
Anderson, Cyber Attack Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1087 (2016) (describing the problem of foreign government-sponsored cyber-attacks).  
For a general discussion of emerging issues related to cybersecurity, see Jennifer Daskal, The 
Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 365–78 (2015). 
 30. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 640–41; see also id. at 641 (“Litigation involving foreign 
states and [state-owned enterprises] appears to be increasing in part due to growing scrutiny 
of their conduct by the U.S. government.”). 
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expand jurisdiction over foreign activity.31  The number of scholars focused 
on the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause’s limitations on personal 
jurisdiction has increased because the Supreme Court has reserved 
addressing the issue of what restraints emanate from the Fifth Amendment 
(as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment)32 and because the Court, in a 
series of decisions, has arguably narrowed the scope of personal 
jurisdiction.33  While Professor Wuerth’s article is one of the few that 
explores Fifth Amendment Due Process limitations on foreign nations,34 it is 
an important addition to this burgeoning literature. 
Second is the long-standing literature focused on the constitutional rights 
of foreigners—separate from concerns related to personal jurisdiction.35  A 
vast amount of scholarship has addressed what constitutional rights, if any, 
foreigners hold outside the United States.36  That literature continues to be 
 
 31. For recent examples, see generally A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of 
Federal Courts, 71 FLA. L. REV. 979 (2019) (advocating for a nation-wide contacts approach 
and arguing that federal court jurisdiction reach is greater under the Fifth Amendment); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 510 (2019) (arguing for 
the expanded use of national jurisdiction); William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal 
Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205 (2018) (advocating for a national contacts 
approach); Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(K)(2):  A Way to 
(Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413 (2017) (arguing 
for a national contacts approach consistent with the Fifth Amendment); Stephen E. Sachs, 
How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301 (2014) (arguing 
for a system of nationwide federal personal jurisdiction).  The literature focused on the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause owes much to the landmark work of Leah Brilmayer and 
Charles Norchi. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth 
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1992). 
 32. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) 
(plurality opinion); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 
102, 113 n. * (1987). 
 33. Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA J. INT’L L. 325, 
325 (2018) (asserting that “the Supreme Court has, in the past few years, turned the United 
States into one of the most jurisdictionally stingy countries in the world.”); Scott Dodson, 
Personal Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 76 (2018) (describing the 
narrowing and restricting of jurisdiction); cf. Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, 
Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1417–34 (2018) (highlighting 
the substantive changes in recent case law, but questioning whether they require a more 
restrictive reading of minimum contacts). 
 34. Admittedly, a flurry of recent student notes has started to address the issue, although 
mostly in the form of legislative reform. See, e.g., Fitch, supra note 21; Lauren J. Rosenberger, 
Comment, Our Allies Have Rights Too:  Judicial Departure from In Personam Case Law to 
Interference in International Politics, 5 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 307 (2017); Lauren Bursey, Note, 
They’re People Too:  Why U.S. Courts Should Give Foreign Agencies and Instrumentalities 
Due Process Rights under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 221 
(2016); Frederick Watson Vaughan, Note, Foreign States Are Foreign States: Why Foreign 
State-Owned Corporations Are Not Persons under the Due Process Clause, 45 GA. L. REV. 
913 (2011). 
 35. For discussions of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, see generally Parrish, 
supra note 25; Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over 
Nonresident, Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 36. For some well-known examples, see generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); KAL 
RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOLLOW THE FLAG?:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient 
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important in a range of contexts.37  Related is the literature addressing 
whether the U.S. Constitution requires adherence with international law.38 
And finally, continued interest exists in the growing area of 
extraterritoriality and transnational law, which has become its own defined 
area of study.39  To the extent that Professor Wuerth’s article suggests some 
limitation on when U.S. courts may be used to achieve what previously 
would have been the purview of international law and diplomacy, Professor 
Wuerth provides an important balm to the dramatic growth of extraterritorial 
laws and the willingness of powerful nations to ignore limits on sovereign 
authority.40 
II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONSTRAINING SOVEREIGN OVERREACH 
Traditionally, international law—not constitutional law—has provided the 
answers to basic questions related to the procedural rights afforded to states.  
While there are good reasons to examine how much the U.S. Constitution 
incorporates international law norms,41 many of the procedural protections 
Professor Wuerth describes (for example the jurisdictional protections 
afforded foreign states) already exist by virtue of international law. 
International law restricts a state’s exercise of power over people and 
activities in other states with which the state has no connection.42  Derived 
 
Constitution?:  Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2009); Gerald 
L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991). 
 37. See generally Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 377 
(2017) (describing why the question of the geographic scope of constitutional rights remains 
an important issue); Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution 
Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225 (2010) (addressing the appropriate relationship between 
international law and constitutional interpretation in the context of the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution). 
 38. For some recent examples, see generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A 
Civilized Nation:  The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of 
International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010); Louis Henkin, International Law 
as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984); David H. Moore, Constitutional 
Commitment to International Law Compliance?, 102 VA. L. REV. 367 (2016). 
 39. For a recent in-depth exploration, see generally DAN MARGOLIES ET AL., THE 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF LAW:  HISTORY, THEORY, POLITICS (2019). 
 40. For a description of how the U.S. has used unilateral, extraterritorial law to project 
power, see Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony:  Unequal Power and the 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 388 (2005) (describing U.S. 
resort to extraterritorial regulation). For a description in the European context, see Anu 
Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (examining “the unprecedented 
and deeply underestimated global power that the European Union is exercising through its 
legal institutions and standards, and how it successfully exports that influence to the rest of 
the world”).  The growth of extraterritorial laws has frustrated multilateral agreement. See 
TONYA L. PUTNAM, COURTS WITHOUT BORDERS: LAW, POLITICS, AND U.S. 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY (2016) (describing how use of extraterritorial law can reduce 
incentives to engage in other forms of lawmaking). 
 41. As Professor Wuerth explains, both constitutional law and international law may 
govern. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 647. 
 42. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298, 306–08 (4th ed. 
1990) (describing the well-established requirement of public international law that a sufficient 
nexus must exist between the subject matter and the state to justify a state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction). 
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from long-standing requirements of sovereign equality, self-determination, 
and non-intervention,43 public international law and the international law of 
jurisdiction44 often restrain states from regulating or intervening in the affairs 
of foreign states.45  States have the right to develop their own economic, 
social, and cultural systems in the way they see fit (absent doing so in a way 
that harms others or violates basic human rights norms).  The purpose of 
these rules is to reduce conflict and promote international peace.46  Other 
international legal principles, such as the principles of good neighborliness,47 
the duty to cooperate,48 and the no-harm rule,49 give meaning to these 
jurisdictional limitations on sovereign power. 
As Professor Wuerth describes, these international law limitations on 
sovereign authority were well-understood at the Founding.50  U.S. states 
were equated to foreign states, with the question being how much sovereignty 
remained after ratification of the Constitution.  And, at least for personal 
jurisdiction, the international laws of jurisdiction were given effect through 
the Due Process Clause.  In the landmark Pennoyer v. Neff decision,51 a 
violation of international law principles related to jurisdiction (then tightly 
 
 43. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members.”); U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (principle of non-intervention); see also 
Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence 
over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1989) (describing well-established principles 
of territorial integrity and political independence).  For an overview, see Stuart Elden, 
Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26 SAIS REV. 11, 
11 (2006) (“Since the end of World War II, the international political system has been 
structured around three central tents: the notion of sovereign equality of state, internal 
competency for domestic jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of existing boundaries.”). 
 44. See generally CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2015); 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen Allen et al. eds., 
2019).  For a classic treatment, see generally Arthur Lenhoff, International Law and the Rules 
on International Jurisdiction, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 5 (1964). 
 45. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106 (June 27) (setting out the customary law principle of non-
intervention).  For the classic description, see EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
(James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1758) (“Nations [are] free and independent of each other, in 
the same manner as men are naturally free . . . .”). 
 46. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state . . . .”).  Hersch Lauterpacht described international law’s mission as leading “to 
enhancing the stability of international peace, to the protection of the rights of man, and to 
reducing the evils and abuse of national power.” Steven R. Ratner,  International Law: The 
Trials of Global Norms, 16 FOREIGN POL’Y 65, 65–66 (1998). 
 47. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) 
(describing the good neighborliness principle). 
 48. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 51 (1949) 
(holding that it is “every state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States”); Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 
R.I.A.A. 281 (1957), 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 156 (1959) (describing the duty of cooperation). 
 49. Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 684, 687–88, 733–34 (1941) 
(setting forth the no-harm principle). 
 50. See Wuerth, supra 1, at 683. 
 51. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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tied to territory) resulted in a Fourteenth Amendment violation.52  As various 
scholars have described, jurisdictional doctrine in the United States drew 
from international law,53 and even the modern test of minimum contacts 
originated in international law.54  While the early cases addressed Fourteenth 
Amendment protections for inter-state actions, and sovereign immunity 
meant claims against foreign states did not often arise, it was clear that 
jurisdictional power was limited by international law.55  It may be true, as 
Professor Wuerth describes in some depth, that a defect in “process” would 
leave a court without a case, and hence without judicial power.56  But more 
simply, it was that the United States understood the well-established 
international law principles that limited sovereign power.  This was less a 
“right” of the foreign state, but instead a structural limitation on U.S. (or any 
state’s) power.57 
In the past, there was little need to consider litigation-related procedural 
protections embedded in the Constitution.  Even putting aside immunity 
doctrines, disputes between foreign states would generally be resolved 
through diplomatic negotiation and international agreement, not through 
litigation.58  And when court proceedings did occur, they were international 
in nature.  The famous Trail Smelter Arbitration is a classic example of this 
approach, where Canada and the United States resolved their cross-border 
disagreements through international agreement and arbitration.59 
 
 52. Id.; see also Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the 
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (1984) (describing how 
Pennoyer limited jurisdiction by express reference to existing and fixed international and 
common law rules); cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1252 
(2017) (arguing that jurisdiction is not a matter of constitutional law, but a matter of general, 
including customary, international law). 
 53. For some examples, see Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the 
United States and the European Community:  Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 121, 123 (1992); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.  849, 871–76 (1989); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of 
Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 796–808 (1955). 
 54. Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 
85, 124 (1998). 
 55. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 647–48. 
 56. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 639, 674–76. 
 57. As Professor Damrosch explains:  “[f]rom Chief Justice Marshall’s day onward, the 
recognition that foreign states and the United States interact as juridical equals on the level of 
international law and diplomacy outside the constitutional system, with rights and duties on 
the international plane not deriving from the Constitution, has shaped the Supreme Court’s 
approach to various problems of domestic law.” Damrosch, supra note 2, at 521 (citing 
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812)). 
 58. Id. at 522 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934)) (noting the need 
to “employ the resources of diplomatic negotiations and to effect such an international 
settlement as may be found to be appropriate, through treaty, agreement of arbitration, or 
otherwise.”). 
 59. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 49; DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 511 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the Trail Smelter case and 
its use of international arbitration); H. Scott Fairley, Private Remedies for Transboundary 
Injury in Canada and the United States: Constraints Upon Having to Sue Where You Can 
Collect, 10 OTTAWA L. REV. 253, 278 (1978) (explaining the barriers to litigation in 
transboundary cases).  For a comprehensive analysis of the Trail Smelter case, see 
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III.  THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
The above has attempted to situate Professor Wuerth’s work in the broader 
conversation about transnational and international law, and to underscore its 
significance.  This final Part expresses some skepticism over Professor 
Wuerth’s approach, while explaining how, ultimately, the main thrust of her 
argument—that U.S. courts face limits on their judicial power, regardless of 
the immunity doctrines—is correct. 
A.  Potential Downsides 
As an initial matter, it is unclear that locating rights of foreign nations in 
the U.S. Constitution would be a positive development, at least from a policy 
perspective.  First, in the past, constitutional doctrine has often made it more 
difficult to enter into international agreements that would clarify and better 
allocate jurisdiction between states.60  The collapse and stalled negotiation 
of the Hague Judgments Convention in the 1990s is just one example where 
U.S. constitutional doctrine rendered international agreement out of reach.61  
To the extent U.S. constitutional doctrine diverges from international law, 
the ability to enter international judgment and jurisdictional treaties will 
likely be frustrated.  Second, many of the concerns that Professor Wuerth 
raises could be corrected legislatively through statutory changes.  When 
foreign states and their enterprises are not entitled to immunity, Congress 
could choose to afford those states the same protections afforded private 
citizens.62  That symmetry could be achieved through amendment of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which would obviate the need to address 
the more challenging and thornier constitutional questions.  For the reasons 
set forth by Professor Wuerth, Congress should have some interest in closing 
this gap. 
A broader pragmatic concern also exists.  Recently, some U.S. scholars 
have re-envisioned international law to suggest that some of the core 
structural limitations no longer apply.63  It is a tendentious position that is 
 
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER 
ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006). 
 60. For a more detailed description of some of this history, see Parrish, Sovereignty, Not 
Due Process, supra note 35, at 53, (citing articles and noting that “U.S. jurisdictional rules 
have made it near impossible to negotiate an international judgments treaty”). 
 61. Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context:  Will the 
Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 320-27, 330-
31 (2002). 
 62. See generally Fitch, supra note 21; Jason E. Myers, Preserving International Comity:  
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 176 and OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 90 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 913 (2017).  As Professor Damrosch argued: “[s]ymmetry and sound policy 
suggest that [foreign states] should likewise enjoy the judicially implemented rights and 
protections available to private parties in connection with commercial and financial activities.” 
Damrosch, supra note 2, at 497. 
 63. For one prominent example, see RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: JURISDICTION § 302, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (finding 
that “[w]ith the exception of sovereign immunity, modern customary international law 
generally does not impose limits on jurisdiction to adjudicate”).  For an explanation for why 
the Fourth Restatement is incorrect and inconsistent with established understandings of 
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contrary to long-established understandings of public international law.  It 
also creates a new standard for determining customary law that, if accepted, 
would potentially eliminate wide swaths of established law.  If this attempt 
and others to further marginalize international law is successful,64 however, 
finding that limits exist in the Constitution would put the U.S. at a 
comparative disadvantage.  When the constitutional and international law 
limits align, as they did in Pennoyer and earlier cases, they are mutually 
reinforcing.  But if there exists only a constitutional right, it provides a one-
way check on state power (limiting U.S. action under U.S. constitutional 
principles, but not providing a similar check on foreign states exercising 
power over U.S. interests, in states that may not have similar domestic law 
restraints).  Unlike constitutional law, international jurisdictional law 
constrains, in principle, the power of all states.  Traditionally the U.S. sought 
to develop international law in a way that was consistent with U.S. law 
limitations precisely for this reason. 
Lastly, it is unclear how far the historical and textual analysis takes us.  In 
the Founding era personal jurisdiction was limited by the territorial limits of 
international law.  Those principles, articulated most famously by Pennoyer, 
were jettisoned not only in the state-to-state context,65 but also in the foreign 
defendant context.66  This is then not to disagree with Professor Wuerth on 
her history, but to question its continuing relevance.  In other words, 
Professor Wuerth is not the first to advocate for a return to first principles, 
without much traction in the U.S. Supreme Court.67  It is true that from time 
to time, some members of the Court have indicated a willingness to use 
history and text to return to earlier doctrine.68  But usually the historical 
approach has been used as a way to reinforce longstanding practice, not to 
depart from it.  And it may be that the Court’s more recent pronouncements 
are best understood as a rejection of the legal realism and fairness approaches 
to jurisdiction articulated most famously by Justice Brennan in the 1970s and 
1980s or an attempt at tort reform, rather than any true willingness to fully 
revisit modern jurisdiction doctrine. 
 
international law, see Austen L. Parrish, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Public International 
Law:  The Fourth Restatement’s New Approach, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND:  THE 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming 2020). 
 64.  GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS (forthcoming 2020). 
 65. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). 
 66. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 116 
(1987). 
 67. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 57 nn. 
226–27 (1990) (arguing that the Court should abandon the notion that state court personal 
jurisdiction is a matter of constitutional law, based on an historical argument); see also Sachs, 
supra note 52, at 1251–55, 1318–27 (urging for Pennoyer’s revival and a return to 
“jurisdiction’s general—and international—law origins”). 
 68. See, e.g., Burnham v. Super. Ct. Cal. Cty. Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 610–16 (1990). 
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B.  Other Considerations 
Ultimately, in many ways my preferred approach is not all that different 
from Professor Wuerth’s.  If the question is whether state power is limited, 
the answer seems clear under established international law principles.  If the 
U.S. Constitution embeds those international law principles substantively, 
then perhaps, despite the pragmatic difficulties described above, that is fine.  
In an article written in the mid-2000s, while I highlighted the doctrinal 
inconsistencies with finding that due process protections apply to foreign 
defendants, I took the position that procedural protections should apply as a 
result of sovereignty and international comity.69  Those sovereignty-based 
imperatives are even stronger when foreign nations are involved. 
The Supreme Court also seems cognizant and receptive again to the idea 
that the U.S. Constitution embodies the sovereignty principles inherent in the 
structure of the international legal system.  Just this year in Gamble v. United 
States, the Court reaffirmed the importance of sovereignty in both the 
domestic and foreign contexts in a Fifth Amendment case.70  And in the 
personal jurisdiction realm, the Court has reaffirmed in the foreign context 
that sovereignty concerns loom large.71 
Still, while Professor Wuerth points to history and text to suggest that 
foreign states are “persons,” she does not fully respond to the broader 
conceptual issue.72  As Professor Damrosch highlighted in her famous piece:  
“[t]o the extent that the Constitution is a social contract establishing a system 
of self-government, permanent outsiders . . . seem to have little claim to 
invoke constitutional ‘rights.’”73  That seems to hold more force for foreign 
nations.  So while there is a logic to saying that if foreign citizens are entitled 
to due process protections so too should foreign states be, it is not entirely 
clear why foreign citizens are protected by virtue of constitutional doctrine 
(rather than international law).74  As others have argued, generally the 
 
 69. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process, supra note 35, at 28–34. 
 70. See generally No. 17–646, (U.S. June 17, 2019). 
 71. Parrish, supra note 25, at 122–25 (describing recent cases). 
 72. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 676–79. 
 73. Damrosch, supra note 2, at 487; see also Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a 
“Person”?  Does it Matter?:  Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 135 (2001) (“[B]oth international law 
experts and judges have taken the view that foreign states stand outside of the constitutional 
structure and, as such, are not entitled to assert constitutional rights”). 
 74. Robin Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien Due Process Paradox in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 116 MICH L. REV. ONLINE 123, 129 (2018) (describing how finding a 
constitutional right to resist personal jurisdiction enjoyed by the nonresident alien defendant 
in a civil lawsuit is remarkably out of alignment with that same nonresident alien’s ability to 
assert nearly every other constitutional right); Gary A. Haugen, Personal Jurisdiction and Due 
Process Rights for Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 109, 118–25 (1993) (exploring the 
tension between the Court’s holding in Verdugo-Urquidez and its jurisprudence in personal 
jurisdiction cases); Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 
826–34 (2013) (describing how outside the personal jurisdiction context aliens have limited 
or no Fifth Amendment rights).  Courts have also noted this problem. See, e.g., Afram Exp. 
Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that although 
“countless cases” assume due process protections apply to foreign defendants, the assumption 
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Constitution, in the context of foreign defendants, “defers to international law 
to prescribe jurisdiction among the nation-states of the world.”75 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Wuerth’s article on the due process rights of foreign nations 
raises important question that will likely remain important as litigation 
involving foreign states in the United States continues.  While she may be 
correct as a matter of history and text, why foreign nations today would have 
constitutional rights rather than litigation-related protections under 
international law remains unclear.  Nevertheless, if Professor Wuerth’s 
suggested approach helps courts more closely examine and more cautiously 
assert power over foreign defendants and foreign states, it may well, on 
balance, be a welcome development. 
 
has not been fully examined); GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 774 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139 
(D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 680 F.3d 805 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“It is not clear why foreign defendants . . . 
should be able to avoid the jurisdiction of United States courts by invoking the Due Process 
Clause when it is established in other contexts that nonresident aliens without connections to 
the United States typically do not have rights under the United States Constitution.”). 
 75. Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order Begins:  
Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1237, 1242 (1998). 
